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ABSTRACT
KELSEY BRIANNE MAYNORD: Auditor Rotation
(Under the direction of Dr. Bowlin)
Using an experiment, this study investigates whether auditor rotation influences
the non-professional investors’ expectations regarding a company’s financial reporting
aggressiveness and their willingness to invest in the company. Specifically, I explore
whether the effects of auditor rotation differ depending on whether the entire audit firm is
rotated or only the engagement partner. Further, I explore whether that effect is
moderated by whether the auditor’s rotation is mandated by law or the company chooses
to rotate its auditor. In an experiment using MBA students, I find little overall effect of
the various rotation regimes. However, I do find that under audit partner rotation the
investors’ expect reported earnings per share to be a more conservative amount when that
rotation is mandatory compared to when it is voluntary.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the primary purposes of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (the “Act”) is enhancing
investor confidence. In accordance with this purpose, the Act requires that audit
engagement partners be associated with the same client for no more than five years
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002). In addition, the Act also required the U.S. General
Accounting Office (the “GAO”) to conduct a study regarding the potential effects on
auditor independence and audit quality of extending this requirement beyond partner
rotation to mandatory firm rotation. After completing this study, the GAO was unable to
conclude whether mandatory firm rotation would be beneficial (GAO, 2003). Despite this
outcome, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (the “PCAOB”) is currently
considering mandating the rotation of audit firms (PCAOB, 2011).
A substantial amount of prior research has explored the effects of firm tenure and
auditor rotation. However, that research has generally focused on whether audit quality
increases or decreases with longer auditor tenure or with auditor rotation. The results of
those studies have been conflicting. Some studies indicate that rotation enhances audit
quality (e.g., Dopuch et al. 2001, Carey and Simnett 2006,) and while others indicate that
rotation decreases audit quality (e.g., Myers et al. 2003). My study differs from prior
research in that I explore the effects of auditor rotation on investors’ expectations of a
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company’s financial reporting aggressiveness and investors’ willingness to invest in the
company. In addition, I explore the differential effects of currently required engagement
partner rotation and the proposed rotation of entire firms.
I further examine whether the effects of auditor rotation are moderated by its
intentionality; that is, I explore whether relative effects of partner and firm rotation
depends on whether the rotation is mandated by law or the client’s voluntary choice.
Prior research suggests that people make choices based on how they infer the intentions
underlying the choices of others (McCabe, Rigdon and Smith, 2003). Those findings
have implications for my setting because companies are currently able to voluntarily
choose to rotate its audit firm. The investors’ responses to that choice would likely
depend on the investors’ inferences regarding management’s intentions underlying that
choice. For example, investors could infer that a company that voluntarily chooses to
rotate its auditors is more committed to high quality financial reporting.
I address my research questions by conducting an experiment in which MBA
students at the University of Mississippi take on the role of the investor. The participants
review materials related to a fictitious company and respond to questions that elicit their
expectations regarding the aggressiveness of the company’s earnings reports and the
likelihood with which they would invest in the company. The results of the study suggest
that when there is mandatory partner rotation, non-professional investors will expect
more conservative financial reporting (i.e., lower reported earnings per share) than the
other scenarios. This indicates that an investor would be more willing to invest in a
company when the audit partner is required to rotate after a set number of years.
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II. BACKGROUND
U.S. Audit Requirements
Auditor rotation is not a new idea to the accounting industry. Mandatory audit
partner rotation was implemented by the SEC Practice Section of the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants (the AICPA) in 1970 (Chi et al. 2009). This mandate
specified that audit partners could only be associated with the same audit engagement for
a maximum of seven years. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 strengthened the
requirement and made it federal law. Specifically the Act required that the lead audit
partner, who has primary responsibility for the audit or who is responsible for reviewing
the audit, rotate off of the engagement after five fiscal years (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002).
While partner rotation has been mandatory for some time, the concept of firm
rotation has been an unresolved object of debate for at least 35 years. For example in
1977, after various financial scandals, Senator Lee Metcalf, chairman of the
Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting, and Management, issued a report (the “Metcalf
Report”) that discussed the role of the Big Eight accounting firms and their
independence. This report noted that a potential solution is audit firm rotation (PCAOB,
2011). However, to this point, others have largely concluded that mandatory audit firm
rotation was not justified in light of its potential costs. Specifically, the Cohen
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Commission, a group established by the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (“AICPA”), discussed the advantages and disadvantages of mandatory audit
firm rotation. However, according to this commission, the potential benefits did not
outweigh the high costs of mandatory firm rotation, so firm rotation was not mandated
(PCAOB, 2011). In addition, the Securities and Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) has also
considered the issue of mandatory audit firm rotation, but in 1994 the SEC staff
concluded that new rotation requirements were not needed (PCAOB, 2011).
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) required that the United States
General Accounting Office, (the “GAO”) conduct a study investigating the potential
effects of required firm rotation on public accounting firms that audit public companies.
The GAO surveyed these companies to gather their opinions about mandatory firm
rotation. Almost all of the responses from the firms indicated the same belief, that the
costs of mandatory firm rotation would be more likely to exceed any benefits.
Additionally, the GAO interviewed other stakeholders, including institutional investors,
bankers, and consumer advocacy groups, and their responses aligned with the firms who
responded to the survey. The GAO concluded that mandatory audit firm rotation might
not be the answer for audit independence and increased audit quality (GAO, 2003). The
report suggested that costs could be much higher than predicted and the benefits of audit
firm rotation are unknown. Instead, the GAO recommended that the SEC and PCAOB
continue to monitor audit independence and that the best course of action was to wait and
observe the effects of the SOX reforms on audit quality and increased independence
(GAO, 2003).
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In August 2011, the PCAOB issued a concept release, Release No. 2011-006,
that explained that the PCAOB would consider requiring periodic firm rotation. The
release further explained that it would begin to gather public opinion on ways to enhance
auditor independence and audit quality (PCAOB, 2011). In particular, the PCAOB
wanted the opinions of the public on mandatory audit firm rotation. The PCAOB wanted
the opinion of those who would have to implement the firm rotation as well as the
investors who would be investing in these companies. It was important to gather their
opinions because a major difference of opinion could cause the PCAOB to look into
alternate ways of increasing independence. Currently, the PCAOB has heard various
arguments on the advantages of mandatory firm rotation and the disadvantages of
mandatory firm rotation. The board is in the process of determining the opinions of the
public and professionals in accounting before moving forward with the proposal. If
mandatory firm rotation is implemented, the board has discussed possible term lengths of
ten years or greater (PCAOB, 2011).

Audit Rotation Requirements Abroad
Other countries have similarly wrestled with the issue of mandating audit
partner and audit firm rotation. The European Parliament and Council of the European
Union responded to the financial scandals in the US by issuing Directive 2006/43/EC (the
“8th Directive”) in 2006 (EU, 2006). The directive laid out similar objectives to financial
reporting, as well as establishing similar audit rotation mandates. The 8th Directive
requires mandatory audit partner rotation, which requires the lead partner to rotate from
an audit engagement after seven years (EU, 2006). However, the European Union (the
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“EU”) does not hold the same standard setting power as the PCAOB in the US and many
of the members of the EU have not implemented partner rotation. Some of Europe is not
even a member of the EU and does not have to follow the directive.
Some countries have implemented mandatory firm rotation, but many of
these countries have since revoked the rotation requirements. Currently, Italy and Brazil
are the only two countries to require mandatory firm rotation, implemented in 1975 in
Italy and 1999 in Brazil (Raiborn, et al, 2006). Italy’s firm rotation requirements allow a
firm to audit a client up to nine years before the audit firm is required to rotate off of the
engagement (GAO, 2003). However, these rotation requirements were not enough to stop
one of the worst financial scams on the European continent to date (Raiborn, et al, 2006).
Parmalat SpA was a multinational dairy food company headquartered in Italy. Grant
Thornton audited the company from 1990-1999 and in 1999 Deloitte & Touche of Italy
became the primary auditor, (Raiborn, et al, 2006). The fraud occurred in the year of the
rotation requirement, mainly because Grant Thornton was allowed to be the secondary
auditor, which is allowed under Italian rotation rule. The mandatory rotation requirement
did not increase audit quality and was not effective in preventing another case of
“financial misconduct by an accounting firm” (Raiborn et al, 2006, 38).
Spain adopted mandatory audit firm rotation in 1988 and enforced the rule
until it was revoked in 1995. In Spain, an auditor could audit a company between three to
nine years. After nine years, the audit firm was rotated off of the client and could not
audit the same client again for another three years (Ruiz-Barbadillo et al., 2009). In their
paper, Ruiz-Barbadillo et al. study the effect of mandatory audit firm rotation in Spain.
They chose to analyze Spain because Spain implemented mandatory firm rotation for six
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years before revoking it. So, they were able to study the before and after affects of
rotation on the business environment in Spain, which is one of the few countries to
require firm rotation. They found that mandatory firm rotation did not enhance auditor
independence, but instead found that the reputation of the audit firm had a greater impact
on audit independence (Ruiz-Barbadillo et al, 2009). Audit firms were influenced more
by how they were perceived in the business world and were more likely to change their
behavior based on these perceptions than on mandated rotation requirements.
Two other countries implemented mandatory audit firm rotation, but
subsequently dropped the rule after a short period of time. Austria implemented
mandatory firm rotation in 2004, which required the audit firm to rotate every six years
(Cameron et al, 2005). It is not possible to see the affects of audit firm rotation in Austria
because Austria dropped the mandate in 2005. Canada implemented mandatory audit firm
rotation involving banks, but the banking legislation was revised in 1991 and the
mandatory firm rotation was not included in the new legislation (Cameron et al, 2005).

Prior Academic Research
The debate regarding auditor rotation has not been limited to the standardsetting boards and legislators, but has also involved various researchers and scholars in
academia. Many individuals who support mandatory audit firm rotation believe that there
will be less pressure on the audit firm to retain a client company, which would result in
less inappropriate financial reporting and would increase the public’s perceptions
regarding auditor independence (Raiborn et al, 2006). The arguments against mandatory
audit firm rotation state that a new auditor will require a certain number of years before
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they are able to fully understand the company’s operations that lack of knowledge will
reduce audit quality (Raiborn et al, 2006). The lack of knowledge will require the
auditors to spend more time understanding the company and the business issues, which
will increase costs of the audit.
Substantial prior research has explored the effects of audit firm rotation or
audit partner rotation on overall audit quality. These research papers include archival
studies and experimental studies attempting to reach conclusions regarding the effects of
audit firm rotation on actual auditor independence and audit quality.
The majority of prior research regarding auditor rotation has been archival in
nature and has yielded conflicting results. For example, several previous studies find that
auditor rotation improves measures of audit quality (e.g., Dopuch et al 2001, Davis et al.
2002), others suggest that longer auditor tenure improves audit quality (e.g., Myers et al
2003 and Mansi et al. 2004), while yet others indicate no effect of auditor rotation and
tenure (e.g., Ruiz-Barbadillo et al. 2009, Kaplan and Mauldin 2008, Chi et al. 2009).
Among a small number of prior experimental studies, the Dopuch, King, &
Schwartz (2001) paper investigates the relationship between mandatory rotation of audit
partners and auditor independence. They designed an experiment to measure auditor’s
independence, which they proxy by the willingness of the auditor to issue reports biased
in favor of management (Dopuch, King, & Swartz, 2001). The paper investigates auditor
independence under required audit partner rotation, required auditor retention, a scenario
that does not require either and a scenario that requires both. The experimental design
included six “managers” and six “auditors” for each of the four conditions, where each
manager would interact with one auditor.
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The results of their experiment favor mandatory rotation because mandated
audit partner rotation resulted in the lowest frequency of reports favoring management.
The highest frequency of favored reports occurred in the regimes without mandatory
rotation or retention (Dopuch, King, & Swartz, 2001). The researchers attribute this to the
economic incentives available to auditors in the long-term relationship with management.
In another experimental study, researchers explored the relationship between
mandatory auditor rotation and professional skepticism on overall audit quality. They
designed an experiment that explored the effect of skepticism in the relationship between
auditor and client (Bowlin, Hobson, & Piercy, 2011). Their results suggest that the effect
of mandatory audit partner rotation on audit quality depended on the whether the auditor
evaluated the client’s integrity or dishonesty, which differs depending on the specific
audit task (Bowlin, Hobson, & Piercy, 2011). Specifically they find that audit rotation
commonly increased audit quality when focused on manager’s honesty and decreased
audit quality when focused on the manager’s dishonesty, when the auditors used
professional skepticism. Also, the ability to talk to the clients increased the level of trust
the auditor placed in clients, which sometimes caused the auditor to decrease the effort on
the audit quality. This would be in favor of rotation because the longer an auditor engages
a client; the level of trust builds to the point where the auditor may decrease their audit
effort.
Wang & Tuttle (2008) experimentally examine the effects of auditor rotation
on auditor-client negotiations. Their findings suggested that mandatory firm rotation
causes changes in the relationships between the auditor and the client, which increase the
likelihood of non-cooperation resulting in an impasse between auditor and client. Further,
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their findings indicate that, “negotiated asset values were more likely to diverge from
client-preferred values with mandatory rotation” (Wang & Tuttle, 2008, 240). The effects
of this conclusion extend beyond the auditor-client relationship and delve into the effect
on the investor.
As described above, nearly all the prior research on auditor rotation has
focused on the auditor-client relationship and how this relationship affects the overall
audit quality and actual auditor independence. However, in a study closely related to my
research question, Kaplan and Mauldin (2008) examine the relative effects of audit firm
and audit partner rotation and the strength or weakness of the audit committee on
investors’ perceptions of auditor independence and investors’ willingness to invest. That
is, where others have focused on rotation’s effects on audit quality, Kaplan and Mauldin
(2008) focus on the impact of rotation on investors’ judgments and investment choices.
They did not find any difference between the two modes of audit rotation on auditor
independence, but they did find that investor perceptions of auditor independence
increased under a strong audit committee versus a weak audit committee (Kaplan and
Mauldin, 2008).
The research question examined in this paper differs from Kaplan and
Mauldin (2008) in that I incrementally explore whether the voluntary or mandatory
nature of the rotation moderates the relative effects of audit firm and audit partner
rotation on investor’s expectations of financial reporting aggressiveness and their
willingness to invest. This question is important because companies could potentially
voluntarily choose to rotate audit firms or to require their auditors to rotate engagement
partners. Such voluntary rotation could be used as to signal a company’s commitment to
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high quality financial reporting. However, a government mandate that audit firms or
partners be rotated would eliminate that signaling mechanism and therefore potentially
affects investors’ perceptions of financial reporting quality and their willingness to invest.
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III. HYPOTHESIS
According to its preamble, one of the primary purposes of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (SOX) was to increase investors’ confidence in financial statements and in the U.S.
capital markets. Because SOX included a partner rotation requirement and demanded the
study of firm rotation, the implementation of the SOX implied that Congress believed
that such rotation would make improve investor’s trust. Therefore, in this study I test this
prediction that rotation will positively affect investor’s confidence in reporting and will
increase investors’ willingness to invest.
Hypothesis 1a: Investor expectations of conservative reporting increases
under the rotation regimes relative to the no rotation regime.
Hypothesis 1b: Investor willingness to invest increases under the rotation
regimes relative to the no rotation regimes.
My second test is a replication of prior research. Kaplan and Mauldin (2008) did
not find a significant difference in non-professional investors’ financial reporting
expectations or willingness to invest under audit firm rotation relative to audit partner
rotation. Consistent with this prior research, I make the following null predictions:
Hypothesis 2a: Investor expectations of conservative reporting does not
increase under the firm rotation relative to partner rotation.
12

Hypothesis 2b: Investor willingness to invest does not increase under firm
rotation relative to partner rotation.
In this study, I also examine the relative effects of mandatory versus voluntary
rotation, as well as no rotation on investor’s willingness to invest in a company. Prior
research in psychology and accounting suggests that people infer the intentions of others
based on the choices other people make (Christ 2008). For example, in the absence of
mandated auditor rotation, companies could voluntarily choose to implement a policy
requiring that their audit partner or audit firm be periodically rotated. Investors could
interpret such a choice as a signal that the company is committed to high quality financial
reporting, transparency, etc. When law mandates auditor rotation, the potential for this
signal is lost.
Therefore, I predict that voluntary rotation improves investors’ trust in financial
reporting and investor willingness to invest.
Hypothesis 3A: Investor expectations of conservative reporting increases
under voluntary rotation relative to mandatory rotation.
Hypothesis 3B: Investor willingness to invest increases under voluntary
rotation relative to mandatory rotation.
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IV. METHODOLOGY
Participants
I address my research questions using a laboratory experiment in which 55
volunteers recruited from an MBA course at the University of Mississippi review an
investment case and make judgments in the role of investors.1,2 Before proceeding with
their task, each participant signed a consent form, confirming that they understood that
they were voluntarily participating in this study and that their identities would remain
anonymous. As part of the case, the participants completed a questionnaire that included
questions regarding their demographic and other background information including age,
years of work experience, gender, investment experience, and a self-assessment of their
ability to understand financial statements. Table 1 provides a summary of their responses.
The students were not asked to put their name or any other identifying personal
information on the materials given to them, so as to maintain their anonymity during the
study.

1

The participants were recruited from one MBA course in the Patterson School of
Accountancy. These participants received bonus points in that course in exchange for
their participation.
2
The University of Mississippi Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed participant
materials for this study and provided approval of the use of human subjects.
14

The scenarios were given to Ole Miss MBA students with those students taking
on the role of investors tasked with making certain investment related judgments and
decisions. By asking them to take on the role of the investor, I am able to learn whether
the different auditor rotation treatments affect their expectations of conservative financial
reporting and their willingness to invest in the company.

Experimental Methodology and Design
The experiment took place in two different sessions, with a total of fifty-five
students participating in the study. The participants were given a set of materials that
were developed based on case materials used by Kaplan and Mauldin (2008). These
materials described a publicly traded company, International Auto Parts (IAP). The
background information on the company included relevant pre-audit balances, such as
sales, total assets, and earnings per share. Participants are told that the same audit firm
has audited IAP for the last five years. However, depending on the treatment condition,
participants are provided with different information regarding auditor rotation policies.
Specifically, participants were assigned to one of the following five treatments
conditions:
A: Control, neither the audit partner or audit firm rotated
B: Mandatory audit firm rotation
C: Mandatory audit partner rotation
D: Voluntary audit firm rotation
E: Voluntary audit partner rotation
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The materials in all of the treatment conditions described all of the potential
treatments so that each participant was aware that other auditor rotation policies could
exist. The materials also clearly explained which specific treatment the company was
operating under.
The materials were labeled A-E, to make it easier to analyze the results. The
materials were coded this way so that each scenario would be evenly distributed to gather
a large enough sample for results. The materials were coded with the letter and a number
so that I would know how many sets of each treatment were distributed. The materials
were placed in consecutive order A1 to E1 and the order was repeated for 2, 3 and so on.
Then I distributed the materials to the participants’ in that sequence in order to ensure I
would have an equal sample sizes for each treatment.
The materials included a description of the role of the audit committee and the
audit partner to make sure that all of the participants had the same basic understanding of
these two roles. Also, a short description of auditor rotation was included to explain the
role of rotation in audits. These were all included in the materials because I wanted the
participants to all be exposed to the same basic knowledge as some of the participants
may have had a background in accounting and would already know these terms
After reading the background and audit rotation requirements, the participants
were told that during the audit, the auditors uncovered an audit difference and that the
difference caused the earnings per share to be overstated. The questions that followed
asked the participants to report the level of earnings-per-share (EPS) that they expected to
ultimately be reported in the financial statements. There were four options for their
expectations of reported EPS: $1.07, $1.08, $1.09, and $1.10. If the expected EPS was
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lower, then the investor was expecting more conservative reporting, and if the expected
EPS was higher then the investor was expecting more aggressive reporting. In addition,
the participants were asked “What is the likelihood that you would invest in this
company?”. Responses were provided on a seven-point Likert scale that ranged from
“highly unlikely” to “highly likely”.
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V. RESULTS
The participants included 55 MBA students and Table 1 provides summary
demographic and background information regarding all of the participants. This table is
importantly demonstrates the participants’ background professional experience, investing
experience and self-assessed ability to understand financial statements. On average, my
participants have 1.6 years of professional work experience, about 63% have owned
stock, and on average, they judge their ability to understand financial statements as a 4.0
on a 7 point scale where 1 indicates very low ability and 7 indicates very high ability.
This background information provides a basis for classifying the participants’ as nonprofessional investors.
Table 2 shows the demographic and background information of the participants
by experimental condition. The participants were randomly assigned to experimental
conditions with eleven participants’ in each condition. This random assignment is
expected to result in an even distribution of the prior experience that could influence the
way in which my manipulated variables affect investor judgments. Untabulated
ANOVAs indicates that these demographic and background variables do not differ
among experimental conditions, except for experience owning stock, which did not
qualitatively affect the results.
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Table 1: Demographic Profile of All Experimental Participants

All Conditions
Age
Years of Professional work experience
Gender (0 = male, 1 = female)
Experience owning stock (0 = no, 1 = yes)
Ability to understand financial reporting (1 = very low, 7 = very
high)
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Mean

SD.
Deviation

23.182
1.636
0.545
0.636

2.099
2.107
0.502
0.511

4.045

1.345

Table 2: Profile of the participants in the five experimental
treatment conditions

Condition A
Age
Years of Professional work experience
Gender (o, male or 1, female)
Experience owning stock (0, no and 1, yes)
Ability to understand financial reporting (1, very low to 7, very
high)
Condition B
Age
Years of Professional work experience
Gender (o, male or 1, female)
Experience owning stock (0, no and 1, yes)
Ability to understand financial reporting (1, very low to 7, very
high)
Condition C
Age
Years of Professional work experience
Gender (o, male or 1, female)
Experience owning stock (0, no and 1, yes)
Ability to understand financial reporting (1, very low to 7, very
high)
Condition D
Age
Years of Professional work experience
Gender (o, male or 1, female)
Experience owning stock (0, no and 1, yes)
Ability to understand financial reporting (1, very low to 7, very
high)
Condition E
Age
Years of Professional work experience
Gender (o, male or 1, female)
Experience owning stock (0, no and 1, yes)
Ability to understand financial reporting (1, very low to 7, very
high)
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Mean

SD.
Deviation

23.000
1.636
0.545
0.636

1.991
2.976
0.522
0.592

4.045

1.457

23.727
1.455
0.455
0.455

2.453
2.207
0.522
0.522

4.045

1.193

23.545
1.955
0.364
0.091

2.018
1.710
0.505
0.302

4.182

1.677

23.636
1.455
0.364
0.545

2.248
2.162
0.505
0.522

3.500

1.597

23.000
0.636
0.545
0.909

2.098
1.343
0.522
0.302

3.773

0.786

Recall that Hypothesis 1a and 1b predicted that investor expectations of
conservative reporting and their willingness to invest would increase under rotation
regimes relative to no rotation regimes. As shown in Table 3, Panel A, the mean and
standard deviation (SD) of expected earnings per share are 1.54 (0.934) and 2.00 (1.057)
under the no rotation regime and combined rotation regimes, respectively, indicating that
non-professional investors expect more conservative reporting when there is no rotation
of any kind. While this result is contrary to Hypothesis 1a, this difference is not
statistically significant (t = _1.40, p = 0.17). In Table 4, Panel A, the mean and standard
deviation (SD) of investor willingness to invest are 3.68 (1.876) and 3.47 (1.014) under
no rotation regime and rotation regimes, respectively. According to the results, investors
are slightly more willing to invest under no rotation relative to rotation regime, which is
inconsistent with Hypothesis 1b. However, this difference is also not significant (t = 1.54,
p = 0.15).
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Table 3: Analysis of expected EPS

a

Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Rotation

Partner
N
Mean
(SD)
11
2.55
(1.04)

Auditor Rotation
Firm
Combined
N
N
Mean
Mean
(SD)
(SD)
11
22
1.82
2.18
(1.25)
(1.18)

Mandatory

11
1.64
(0.92)

11
2.00
(0.89)

22
1.82
(0.91)

Combined

22
2.09
(1.06)

22
1.91
(1.06)

44
2.00
(1.06)

Voluntary

Control

Control

11
1.54
(0.93)

Panel B: ANOVA-Expected EPS
Effect
Firm Rotation vs Partner
Rotation
Voluntary Rotation vs
Mandatory Rotation
Interaction of Effects
a

df

F

Prob.

1

0.34

0.56

1
1

1.36
3.05

0.25
0.09

Participants indicated expected EPS of either $1.07, $1.08, $1.09, or $1.10; however, I have recoded these

choices to 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively.
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Table 4: Analysis of investors' willingness to investb
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Rotation

Auditor Rotation
Partner
N
Mean
(SD)
11
3.32
(0.75)

Voluntary

Firm
N
Mean
(SD)
11
3.32
(0.90)

Combined
N
Mean
(SD)
22
3.32
(1.15)

Mandatory

11
3.50
(0.98)

11
3.73
(0.75)

22
3.61
(0.86)

Combined

22
3.41
(1.18)

22
3.52
(0.84)

44
3.47
(1.014)

Control

11
3.68
(1.88)

Panel B: ANOVA-investors willingness to invest
Effect
Firm Rotation vs Partner
Rotation
Voluntary Rotation vs
Mandatory Rotation
Interaction of Effects
b

Control

df

F

Prob.

1

0.13

0.72

1
1

0.89
0.13

0.35
0.72

Measured on a seven point scale 1(highly unlikely) to 7 (highly likely)
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Figure 1: Expectation of Reported EPS by Treatmenta
2.8
Expectation of Reported EPS

2.6
2.4
2.2
2
Voluntary Rotation

1.8

Firm Rotation

1.6
1.4
1.2
1
Firm Rotation

a

Partner Rotation

Participants indicated expected EPS of either $1.07, $1.08, $1.09, or $1.10; however, I have recoded these

choices to 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively.
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Hypothesis 2a makes the null prediction that investor expectations of conservative
reporting will not be higher under the firm rotation regime relative to the partner rotation
regime. Table 3, Panel A indicates that the mean and standard deviation of earnings per
share are 1.91 (1.07) and 2.09 (1.07) for firm rotation and partner rotation, respectively,
indicating that investors’ expected more conservative reporting under firm rotation
relative to partner rotation, which supports Hypothesis 1a. Table 3, Panel B indicates that
this main effect is not significant; therefore, I do not reject the null prediction of
Hypothesis 2a.
Hypothesis 2b similarly suggests that investor willingness to invest will not be
higher under firm rotation relative to partner rotation. The mean and standard deviation of
investors’ willingness to invest are 3.52 (0.84) and 3.41 (1.18) for firm rotation and
partner rotation, respectively, and are shown in Table 4, Panel A. According to the
ANOVA in Table 4, Panel B, there is no significant difference between the two means.
Firm rotation was only slightly higher than partner rotation, but there was not enough of a
difference to say that investors’ preferred one to the other. Panel B shows that the
difference between firm rotation or partner rotation is only slightly significant (F = 0.13,
p = 0.72) and so only slightly influences investors’ willingness to invest.
Hypothesis 3a and 3b predicted the effects of voluntary and mandatory rotation on
expectations on conservative reporting and willingness to invest. Hypothesis 3a predicted
that investor expectations of conservative reporting increased under voluntary rotation
relative to mandatory rotation. As show in Table 3, Panel A, the mean and standard
deviation are 2.18 (1.18) and 1.82 (0.91) for voluntary rotation and mandatory rotation,
respectively. This result indicated that, contrary to Hypothesis 3a, investors expected
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more conservative reporting under mandatory rotation relative to voluntary rotation.
However, according to the ANOVA in Table 3, Panel B, this difference is not significant
(F = 1.36, p = 0.25).
Hypothesis 3b predicted that investor willingness to invest would increase under
voluntary rotation relative to mandatory rotation. Table 4, Panel A summarizes the means
and standard deviations related to this hypothesis. The mean and standard deviation are
3.32 (1.15) and 3.61 (1.01) for voluntary rotation and mandatory rotation, respectively.
Contrary to the prediction in Hypothesis 3b, investors are more willing to invest when
mandatory rotation occurs for audit partner or firms than when they are voluntarily
rotated. Panel B in Table 4 indicates that the difference in investor willingness to invest
between the voluntary rotation and mandatory rotation conditions is not significant (F =
0.89, p = 0.35).
It is important to note that while the main effects of partner/firm rotation and
voluntary/mandatory rotation are not significant and do not support my hypothesis, these
two variables do interact to affect investor expectations of conservative financial
reporting. Specifically, as indicated in Table 3 and Figure 1, under firm rotation, there is
little difference in investors’ financial reporting expectations between the mandatory and
voluntary rotation conditions (2.00 and 1.82, respectively). However, under the partner
rotation condition, the difference in investor expectations between the mandatory and
voluntary rotation conditions is larger (1.64 and 2.55, respectively). The interaction term
in the ANOVA in Table 3, Panel B suggests that these differences are not due to chance
(F = 3.05, p = 0.09).
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VI. CONCLUSION
My study examines important questions regarding audit rotation and investor
behavior that have been the subject of many debates among standard setters but have
been the subject of little previous academic research. This study focuses on nonprofessional investors and their investment behavior under various rotation conditions.
Specifically, I explore the relative effects of partner and firm rotation as well as
mandatory versus voluntary rotation on investors’ expectations of conservative reporting
and their willingness to invest.
In general, the results of the study indicate little difference in investor
expectations of conservative reporting and willingness to invest under the various
rotation conditions. However, when rotation is required, the investors’ expect more
conservative reporting and exhibit a greater willingness to invest when the rotation is
mandatory when only the partner is required to rotate. These results are important as they
indicate that, contrary to the beliefs of proponents of auditor rotation, non-professional
investors are not necessarily more trusting of company management or more willing to
investor when auditor independence is enhanced through rotation.
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As with any experimental research, there are always limitations. My study used
MBA students to take on the role of the non-professional investor. Therefore, my results
may not generalize to populations that include more sophisticated, professional investors.
The case materials used in this study describe a fictitious company with a only a
limited amount of information being given to the participants. The participants were
provided with few details of the company and their auditors, and while this enhances the
degree of experimental control, real-world investors would likely have access to much
more information about the company. It is possible that investors would behave
differently when more comprehensive information is provided.
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APPENDIX
Kelsey Maynord

School of Accountancy

Kbmaynor@go.olemiss.edu

University of Mississippi

PHONE (423) 987-2440

September, 2012
Thank you for participating in this study of investor decision-making based on financial
and non-financial information. This is a great opportunity for you to contribute in a
meaningful way to research. Our research, along with the work of others, is intended to
advance our understanding of the financial reporting process and be informative to
financial reporting policy setters.
The study takes about 10-15 minutes and involves reading a brief scenario describing a
public company preparing their annual financial statements. During the audit, the auditor
discovers a potentially important audit difference. An audit difference occurs when the
company has recorded an event and/or transaction in the financial statements differently
than the auditors believe is appropriate under generally accepted accounting principles.
Following the scenario, you will be asked to provide your impressions about the outcome
and the behavior of management, the auditor, and the audit committee, and then answer
some questions about your background.
In the scenario many of the complexities of the actual decision making environment have
been simplified to limit the demands of your time as well as to aid interpretation of your
responses. The validity of this study and its contribution depend on your cooperation.
While the scenario is brief, it is important that you read and attend to the material
carefully. Also, because there are several versions of the scenario, it is important that you
complete your questionnaire independently.
You are not identified in any way on any form. No forms are numbered and we do not
ask your name at any time. Your participation is voluntary and you can quit at any time.
If you have any questions, please contact me at Kbmaynor@go.olemiss.edu. For
additional information regarding human participation in research, please feel free to
contact the Campus IRB Office.
Thank you for your participation.
Kelsey Maynord
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Background
On the next page, you will be asked to estimate a typical, publicly traded, company’s
response to a set of circumstances. When making that assessment, assume the following
about the company and its financial reporting process.
International Auto Parts (IAP) is a publicly traded medium-sized automobile parts
manufacturer and it is headquartered in a legal jurisdiction outside of the United States.
IAP’s management is responsible for preparing and certifying the company’s financial
statements.
The independent auditor, an international public accounting firm, is responsible for
auditing the financial statements. Legal jurisdictions around the world vary in whether
audit firms are limited in the number of years they may audit a particular company.
Among jurisdictions that do not require this accounting firm rotation, some limit the
number of years an audit partner may be associated with the audit of a particular
company. In jurisdictions where neither firms nor partner are limited in the number of
years, the firms can be associated with a particular client as long as they like. Some
voluntarily rotate their audit periodically or ask their audit firms to rotate the partner of
the audit. Some jurisdictions put these limitations in place, but this jurisdiction does not
require the audit partner or the audit firm to be limited in the number of years associated
with a company. The company has chosen not to rotate voluntarily. The audit
committee of the Board of Directors is responsible for overseeing the conduct of these
activities by management and the independent auditor.
B: [The independent auditor, an international public accounting firm, is responsible for
auditing the financial statements. Legal jurisdictions around the world vary in whether
audit firms are limited in the number of years they may audit a particular company.
Among jurisdictions that do not require this accounting firm rotation, some limit the
number of years an audit partner may be associated with the audit of a particular
company. In jurisdictions where neither firms nor partner are limited in the number of
years, the firms can be associated with a particular client as long as they like. Some
voluntarily rotate their audit periodically or ask their audit firms to rotate the partner of
the audit. Some jurisdictions put these limitations in place, and this jurisdiction does
require the audit firm to be limited in the number of years associated with a company.
The company has chosen not to rotate voluntarily. The audit committee of the Board of
Directors is responsible for overseeing the conduct of these activities by management and
the independent auditor.]
C: [The independent auditor, an international public accounting firm, is responsible for
auditing the financial statements. Legal jurisdictions around the world vary in whether
audit firms are limited in the number of years they may audit a particular company.
Among jurisdictions that do not require this accounting firm rotation, some limit the
number of years an audit partner may be associated with the audit of a particular
company. In jurisdictions where neither firms nor partner are limited in the number of
years, the firms can be associated with a particular client as long as they like. Some
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voluntarily rotate their audit periodically or ask their audit firms to rotate the partner of
the audit. Some jurisdictions put these limitations in place, but this jurisdiction does
require the audit partner to be limited in the number of years associated with a company.
The company has chosen not to rotate voluntarily. The audit committee of the Board of
Directors is responsible for overseeing the conduct of these activities by management and
the independent auditor.]
D: [The independent auditor, an international public accounting firm, is responsible for
auditing the financial statements. Legal jurisdictions around the world vary in whether
audit firms are limited in the number of years they may audit a particular company.
Among jurisdictions that do not require this accounting firm rotation, some limit the
number of years an audit partner may be associated with the audit of a particular
company. In jurisdictions where neither firms nor partner are limited in the number of
years, the firms can be associated with a particular client as long as they like. Some
voluntarily rotate their audit periodically or ask their audit firms to rotate the partner of
the audit. Some jurisdictions put these limitations in place, and this jurisdiction does not
require the audit firm to be limited in the number of years associated with a company.
The company has chosen to rotate voluntarily the audit firm. The audit committee of the
Board of Directors is responsible for overseeing the conduct of these activities by
management and the independent auditor.]
E: [The independent auditor, an international public accounting firm, is responsible for
auditing the financial statements. Legal jurisdictions around the world vary in whether
audit firms are limited in the number of years they may audit a particular company.
Among jurisdictions that do not require this accounting firm rotation, some limit the
number of years an audit partner may be associated with the audit of a particular
company. In jurisdictions where neither firms nor partner are limited in the number of
years, the firms can be associated with a particular client as long as they like. Some
voluntarily rotate their audit periodically or ask their audit firms to rotate the partner of
the audit. Some jurisdictions put these limitations in place, and this jurisdiction does not
require the audit partner to be limited in the number of years associated with a company.
The company has chosen to rotate voluntarily the audit partner. The audit committee of
the Board of Directors is responsible for overseeing the conduct of these activities by
management and the independent auditor.]
Audit Committee
The audit committee reports to and acts on behalf of the Board of Directors and is
composed of 3 members.
• All members are independent outside directors (i.e., no relationship between the
directors and the company or its officers).
• Two of the members are CPAs. All three are financial experts as defined by the
SEC.
During the year the audit committee meets 6 times. At each meeting, the committee
meets the senior members of management, the vice president of internal audit, and the
independent auditors in private, separate sessions.
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Audit Differences
Recall that an audit difference occurs when the company has recorded an event and/or
transaction in the financial statements differently than the auditors believe is appropriate
under generally accepted accounting principles. Such an audit difference is considered
an uncorrected audit difference when management does not change the financial
statements. No adjustment to the financial statements is needed if management, audit
committee, and the audit partner believes that the dollar amount of the audit difference is
immaterial to the financial statements taken as a whole.
Audit Partner Role
The objective of the audit is to assess risk management and negotiate with management
about misstatements on the financial statements. The audit report is the final product of
the audit and it is the way auditors communicate the audit findings to the users. The role
of the audit partner is to lead a team of auditors and managing the audit. The audit partner
is also in charge of collecting evidence to verify the financial statements.

IAP has just completed the process of preparing their annual financial statements. For
the current year, relevant pre-audit balances were:
Sales
Total assets
Inventories
Net earnings
Earnings Per Share (EPS)

$1,300 million
$1,100 million
$ 375 million
$ 110 million
$ 1.10 per share

Analysts’ Consensus Forecast:
As a public company, the company’s stock has attracted a modest following by financial
analysts. For the current year, financial analysts’ consensus EPS forecast for IAP is:
Forecasted EPS

$ 1.09 per share

Audit Difference:
During the audit, the auditor uncovered only one potentially important audit difference.
The difference is due to management’s estimate of the inventory obsolescence allowance.
The auditor believes that the recorded allowance is outside a reasonable range by an
amount that overstates current earnings per share by $.03 (2.7% of earnings, .08% of
inventory, and .02% of total assets).
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Required: Based on the information above and assuming the new proposal on the
preceding page is in effect, please answer the following questions.
1.

The most likely EPS amount a public company such as IAP would finally report
in the audited financial statements for the year is (circle one):
$1.07
$1.08
All of the audit
difference corrected

2.

$1.09

$1.10
None of the audit
difference corrected

The proportion of public companies in similar circumstances that would finally
report each of these audited EPS amounts for the year is (fill in each blank;
amounts should total to 100%):
EPS
Percent Reporting

3.

$1.07
____%

$1.08
____%

$1.09
____%

$1.10
____%

An item becomes “material” when it would affect the decisions of a reasonably
informed financial statement user. Please indicate your impressions of the relative
materiality of the described audit difference of $.03 per share.
|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
Not Material
Highly
At All
Material

4. What is the likelihood that you would invest in this company?
|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
Not at All
Likely

Highly
Likely

Additional Questions
Without looking back, please answer the following questions about the IAP’s scenario.
1. Actual earnings per share will miss (be below) the analysts’ consensus forecast if
management fully corrects the audit difference.
|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
Completely
Completely
Disagree
Agree
2

Please rate IAP’s audit committee along the following dimensions:
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a. Independence
b. Expertise
c. Diligence/Effort

|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
very weak
very strong
|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
very low
very high
|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
very low
very high

3. Please rate IAP’s audit partner along the following dimensions:
a. Independence
b. Expertise
c. Diligence/Effort
d. Trustworthiness

|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
very weak
very strong
|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
very low
very high
|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
very low
very high
|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
very low
very high

4. Please rate IAP’s management along the following dimensions:
a. Expertise
b. Diligence/Effort
c. Trustworthiness

|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
very low
very high
|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
very low
very high
|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
very low
very high

36

Background Questions
1. What is your gender?

Male

Female

2. How many years of professional work experience do you have? ____ years
3. How old are you?

____ years

4. Do you currently own or have you owned stocks in the past?

Yes

No

5. Please assess your understanding of financial reporting.
|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
Very low
very high
6. In general, how important are the following groups in improving the credibility of
financial reporting by companies?
a. Management

|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
Not important
very important

b. Audit Committee

|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
Not important
very important

c. External Auditor

|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
Not important
very important

7. Are you currently, or have you in the past been, a board member of a public
company? Yes No
8. Are you currently, or have you in the past been, an audit committee member of a
public company? Yes
No
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9. Are you currently, or have you in the past been, an outside auditor? Yes No
10. Are you currently, or have you in the past been, part of the management team
responsible for financial reporting? Yes No
Attitudes about Management and Auditing
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the statements by placing a
mark on the scale that most closely corresponds to your belief.
1. The financial statements contained in the annual report to stockholders are the
result of a negotiation process between management and their external auditors.
|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
Strongly disagree
neutral
strongly agree
2. Higher uncertainty about uncorrected audit differences reduces the overall
credibility of the annual audited financial statements.
|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
Strongly disagree
neutral
strongly agree
3. Higher uncertainty about uncorrected audit differences reduces the overall
trustworthiness of the annual audited financial statements.
|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
Strongly disagree
neutral
strongly agree
4. My assessment of the trustworthiness of the annual audited financial statements
strongly influences my investment decision.
|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
Strongly disagree
neutral
strongly agree

Thank you for participating in this study.
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